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NOTES

under the auspices of the Interstate Commerce Act, could transport passengers
from one terminal to another. In Public Util. Comm'n v. United States the conflict between the California Public Utilities Code and the federal procurement
regulations also is analogous to the conflict in the Avocado case. The state statute
was held preempted-it could no longer dictate rates to be paid by the agencies
of the United States when the agencies could negotiate their own rates pursuant
to federal legislation.
The Atchison and Public Util. Comm'n cases are extremely valuable to our
analysis of the conflict in the Avocado case. They illustrate sinilar conflicts where
state economic legislation was held preempted when it purported to impose regulations over subject matter regulated by federal legislation.
After examining the policy of the Agricultural Adjustment Act it is evident
that its purpose was to secure greater economic benefits to the fanner. The exclusion of many tons of Florida avocados annually undoubtedly inflicts economic
hardship on the Florida grower and frustrates the purpose of the federal act.
Here an often quoted statement from one of the leading cases on preemption is
pertinent.
If the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be accomplished-if its operation
within its chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their
natural effect-the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress within the
sphere of its delegated power.44
In light of the foregoing comparison between the Avocado case and the
Atchison, Northern Natural Gas Co., and Public Util. Comnmn cases, where the
Court found preemption m analogous fact situations, and in light of the frustration of the clear congressional policy embodied in the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, it is surprising that the Supreme Court did not hold the state maturity regulations preempted.
Stephen Jones*
44 Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
0
Member, Second Year Class.

SHOULD CONGRESS DEFINE RACIAL IMBALANCE?
The neighborhood school is as traditional in America as public education
itself. Although there are other methods of placing pupils in specified schools,
by far the most prevalent is that of assigning them along neighborhood lines.1
In the nearly twelve years since Brown v. Board of Edue.,2 however, the concept of the neighborhood school has met with increasing criticism and in many
1
In Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F Supp. 819, 829 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 F.2d
200 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964), Judge Beamer said, "The
neighborhood school which serves students within a prescribed district is a long and well
established rstitution in American public school education. It is almost universally
used, particularly in the large school systems. It has many social, cultural, and administrative advantages which are apparent without enumeration."
2347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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cases modification, 8 all in the interest of eliminating "racial imbalance" in the
public schools. Thus far the attacks on the neighborhood school have originated
in the courts, 4 state legislatures, 5 state departments of education,0 and local
school boards.7 But the history of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 indicates that
the entry of the federal government into the field of de facto segregation 9 may
be forthcoming.
The 1964 Act expressly prohibits federal activity in the de facto area, but
the Admimstration's proposed bill10 contained references to "racial mbalance.""1
These references were deleted by the House Judiciary Subcommittee. 2 The
definition of "desegregation in public education," as submitted to the House by
the Judiciary Committee was "the assignment of students to public schools without
regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin."' 8 Opponents of the bill

were fearful that silence on the issue of racial imbalance would be interpreted
by some as including it within the Act. So they introduced an amendment which
added to the definition the phrase: "[Blut 'desegregation! shall not mean the
assignment of students to overcome racial imbalance." 14 The Act grants to the
Attorney General and the United States Commissioner of Education certain
powers to enforce the provisions on education. 15 The section delineating these
powers was amended in the Senate to the effect that "nothing herein shall
3 See generally Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 193 (1964); Hyman & Newhouse, Desegregation in the
Schools: The Present Legal Situation, 14 BurrAo L. REV. 208, 220 (1964); Kaplan,
Segregation Litigation and the Schools, 58 Nw.-U.L. REv. 1, 157 (1964).
4 E.g., Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.) aff'd, 324 F.2d
209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191
F Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See generally Bickel, supra note 3; Hyman & Newhouse,
supra note 3; Kaplan, supra note 3; Milboum, De Facto Segregation and the Neighborhood School, 9 WAYm L. Rv. 514 (1963); Comment, Equal Protection and the Neighborhood School, 13 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 150 (1964); Comment, De Facto SegregationThe Elusive Spectre of Brown, 9 VmL. L. RBv. 283 (1964).
5 Mass. Acts 1965, ch. 641, §§ 1, 2; MAss. Gmt. LAws, ch. 15, §§ 1H, 1I, 1J, 1K,
ch. 71, §§ 37C; Irm.. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 10-21.3 (Smith-Hurd 1963).
6 CAL. A m. CoDE Title 5, §§ 2010-11; New York State Comm'r of Educ., Memorandum to all Chief Local School Adminstrators and Presidents of Boards of Educ.,
8 RACE EEL. L. REP. 738 (1963).
7 See, e.g., U.S. Civ Rioirs Coinvex', Crvm Bic
R
s U.S.A./PuBic Scaoors
NoRTH AND WEsT 1962, at 7.
8 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
9 The accepted distinction between de lure and de facto segregation is: "'[Die lure'
should refer to segregation created or maintained by official act, regardless of its form.
'De facto' should be limited to segregation resulting from fortuitous residential patterns."
Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F Supp. 181, 194 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
10 Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Committee on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
11 Id., at 20-22. The terms "racial imbalance" and "de facto segregation" will be
used interchangeably throughout this note.
12 Ibid.
Is Id. at 51
14 110 CoNG. lEc. 2280 (1964) (remarks of Representative Cramer of Flonda).
15 79 Stat. 248 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000.-6(a) (2) (1964).
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empower any official or court of the United States to issue any order seeking
to achieve racial balance."' 6
In light of such facts one might conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
put an end to the idea of federal entry into the de facto area. But there are
other factors which indicate that the contrary may well be true, and that it is
not unreasonable to assume that federal legislation dealing with the problem of
racial imbalance may be near at hand. It seems unlikely that the 1965 Voting
Rights Act' 7 will be the last civil rights legislation to be considered and approved
by Congress. The increasing federal activity in voting rights since 1957,18 taken

together with the present Admmstration's stated policy on civil rights' 9 and the
Admnstration's tremendous success in getting congressional approval of legislative programs, 20 could indicate that other civil rights problems will receive the
attention of Congress during the next few years. The problems of de facto segregation are most acute in our large urban areas, and one of its major causes is discrimmation in housing. One example of the Admmistration's abundant interest in
this particular cause of de facto school segregation is the recent creation of a
21
cabinet post designed to deal exclusively with housing and urban development.
There is then at least a strong possibility, if not a probability, that there soon
will be an appeal from the executive branch requesting congressional assistance
in the effort to overcome racial imbalance in public schools. It is the purpose of
this note to suggest that if Congress reconsiders the problem of de facto school
segregation, serious attention should be given to the formulation of a uniform
definition of "racial imbalance."
In order to explore the possibility of arriving at an adequate definition we
16110 CoNG. Ec. 11929 (1964) (remarks of Senator Dirksen). It is interesting
to note that, while the amendment to the definition of "desegregation in education" was
introduced by opponents of the bill in the House, the amendment to this section was
introduced by proponents of the bill in the Senate as part of minority leader Dirksen's
substitute bill. This move can best be explained by the fact that the substitute bill was a
compromise measure designed to please several factions. See N.Y. Times, June 20, 1964,
p. 11, col. 1.
17 79 Stat 437, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

18 Civil Rights Act of -1957, 71 Stat. 634, 42 U.S.C. § 1971, Civil Rights Act of
1960, 74 Stat. 86, 42 U.S.C. § 1971; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971.

19 Although a strong attitude in favor of civil rights is home out by the President's
public statements (e.g., N.Y. Times, June 20, 1964, p. 1, col. 8; July 3, 1964, p. 9, col. 2)
perhaps the best illustration of this policy is the fact that scarcely two weeks after
President Kennedy's assassination, Mr. Johnson decided to press for passage of a strong
civil rights bill despite opinions of his advisors that odds were sixty-forty against passage.
Time, Jan. 1, 1965, p. 25.
2
0See Newsweek, July 19, 1965, p. 20; U.S. News & World Report, April 26, 1965,
pp. 41-42.
2
l Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 451, 12 U.S.C. § 1749aa.
Named to head the newly created department was Robert C. Weaver, first Negro to
hold a cabinet post and former char-man of the board of the NAACP (1960). The Senate
confirmed Mr. Weaver's nomination on Jan. 17, 1966. 112 CoNG. lEc. 341 (daily ed.
Jan. 17, 1966). The President made specific reference to the problems of education in
the cities when he spoke to Congress requesting passage of the Housing and Urban
Development bill. Presidential Message, 111 CoNG. REc. 3812 (1965).
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must first look into the legislative history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to ascertain
what treatment was there given to the problem of de facto segregation. Next it
will be necessary to turn to the practical problem of formulating a definition of
"racial imbalance" which can be applied uniformly from community to community. And finally, in any discussion of attempts to legislate concerning de facto
school segregation a look at the constitutional aspects is inescapable.
Treatment of Raczal Imbalance in the Proposed Bill-1963-1964
The definition of desegregation in public education, as submitted to the
members of the House by the Judiciary Committee, 22 could be construed as
including the elimination of racial imbalance. In addition to this language there
were provisions in the proposed bill which actually included the term "racaal
imbalance." These dealt with technical assistance to school boards, 23 training
institutes for teachers and other personnel to deal with problems of racial mbalance,24" grants to school boards, 25 grants to teachers, 2 6 and grants for the
employment of specialists on the subject of racial imbalance. 2 7 As already noted,
these references were deleted in committee. 28 The amendments passed by the
House and Senate, respectively, and incorporated into the Act, went beyond
silence to forbid expressly any congressional assistance in alleviating racial imbalance. One of the reasons given for this hands off policy was that no adequate
definition of the term could be found.2 9 This problem of definition-deciding
what concentration of a minority group constitutes racial imbalance-was reported by the United States Commission on Civil Rights as one of two basic
difficulties involved in the attempt to combat racial imbalance in the schools.3 0
The reasons why individual members of Congress rejected the proposals concerning de facto segregation were not to be found in searching the committee
reports and the Congressional Record. In the words of one legislator, "for some,
no doubt, there was an aversion to the imposition of Federal remedies to deal
with 'racial imbalance' in public education. For others there may have been
concern that inclusion of such a provision would endanger the passage of the
entire civil rights bill."31 It seems clear, however, that a workable definition of
"racial imbalance" would have increased the chances of extending the Act to
deal with de facto segregation.
22

Hearings 51.

23 Id. at 20.
24 Ibid.

25 Id. at 21.
26I
.
27 Ibid.

28 Id. at 20-22.

U.S.

CoDE CoNG. &AD.NEws, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 2508 (1964).
Crvm acenrs Covave'N REP. 55. The second difficulty noted by the commission was that the Supreme Court has not made a definite ruling on the question of
whether the equal protection clause imposes a duty on the school board to eliminate
de facto
3 1 school segregation.
Letter From the Hon. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee,
to the Hastings Law Journal, Nov. 3, 1965. The then Senator Hubert Humphrey, floor
manager of the bill in the Senate, expressed the opinion that problems of racial imbalance are best handled by the local school boards and the courts. Senate debate on
Title IV, Desegregation in Public Education, 110 CoNG. BIEc. 13344-45 (1964).
29 2

30 1963
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A Workable Definition: The Reapportionment Analogy
Since the legislative reapportionment cases deal with unbalanced legislative
districts, they may offer a useful analogy in an attempt to achieve a practical
definition of "racial imbalance." But there are two important differences which
must be taken into account. First, where legislative reapportionment is the problem we are dealing with ]ust one category of person-the voter. In the school
cases we deal with at least two--black and white-and sometimes more. Second,
legislative district lines can be drawn in a much more arbitrary fashion than
school district lines, even when the possibility of "bussing" is considered. Polling
places are portable; schools are not. Where a shift in population from country to
city has caused unequal weighting of rural votes, the entire reason behind the
original districting is destroyed, and new legislative districts are required. But
where a similar shift causes de facto segregation in the schools, the use of the
neighborhood school plan still promotes the same values of safety and convemence
as when the original districting was done. That is, it remains the most economical
32
and practical way to run a large school system.
Notwithstanding the differences, however, there are notable similarities. In
reapportionment, assuming that the original districting was reasonable and provided equal representation of all the voters in the beginning, the movement of
population from country to city has given the rural voters disproportionate legislative power. The city voters have been demed equal representation by the failure
of the state to redistrict. Similarly, if the original school zoning was done reasonably and resulted in equal educational opportunity for all children, the movement of population out to the suburbs and into the ghettos has resulted in racially segregated schools. The ghettolzed children have been denied equal
educational opportunity by the failure of the school board, as an arm of the
state,33 to rezone the schools. Since the Brown decision 34 segregated schools
have been recognized as inherently unequal. 35 But more often than not the
school which contains a disproportionate number of colored students suffers from
additional specific inequalities such as overcrowded classrooms, worn-out facili36
ties, and higher pupil-teacher ratios.
The recent reapportionment case of Silver v. Browns7 is especially helpful
in our search for a practicable definition of "racial imbalance." It was an action
brought by a citizen of California seeking a writ of mandate to require certain
State officials to enforce equal protection of the laws in the election of State
senators and assemblymen. The court found that the State had a population of
15,693,338, and that an "ideal" assembly district should contain one-eightieth
of the total population or 196,167 persons. At the time of the suit the largest
district was 56.1 per cent larger than the ideal district, and the smallest was
32 See Comment, Equal Protection and the Neighborhood School, 13 CATHOLIC U.L.
REv. 150, 156 (1964) where the author discusses and rejects the reapportionment

analogy for these reasons.
33
Since the Brown decision it has been assumed that the school board is an organ
of the state government. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (fourteenth amendment prohibits discrimination in public schools whatever agency of the state takes action).
34347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35
Id. at 495.
3
6MYDAr, AxN
A
Dnm.muD
339, 833, 947 (2d ed. 1962).
37 63 A.C. 278, 46 Cal. Bptr. 308, 405 P.2d 132 (1965).
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63.2 per cent smaller. The court decided that no legislative district could deviate
more than 15 per cent from the ideal district even though the United States
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims88 and Roman v. Sincock 39 had "eschewed
establishing rigid mathematical standards for evaluating legislative apportionment."40 In Reynolds Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority, had said,
"Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement."41 In Roman the Chief Justice, also speaking for the Court, said, "[I]t Is
neither practicable nor desirable to establish rigid mathematical standards for
evaluating the constitutional validity of a state reapportionment scheme under
the Equal Protection Clause." 42
It is clear the California court believed it could limit the deviation factor
to fifteen per cent in either direction without being too ngid and requiring
mathematical exactness. Cief Justice Traynor, who wrote the opinion, noted
that in the Reynolds case the Supreme Court had held that some deviation from
the requirement of establishing equally populous districts may be justified on
the ground that it is important to have compactness and contiguity and to
maintain the integrity of political subdivisions. Applying that doctrine to the
Silver case the Califorma court said that "the policies underlying the requirements of compactness and contiguity and the maintenance of integrity of political
subdivisions cannot justify such extensive departures from population-based
representation as exist in the case of the Assembly."4 3 And "we deem it only fair
to the Legislature to set forth limits within which an apportionment would at
least carry a strong presumption of validity under the equal protection clause
and beyond which it would be seriously suspect."44 The Califoria Chief Justice
also noted that the figure of fifteen per cent was the same as that adopted by
the United States House of Representatives 45 in establishing guidelines for
congressional reapportionment. 46 (The bill establishing such guidelines had been
passed by the House on March 16, 1965, 47 and was being considered by the
48
Senate at the time of Silver.)
Can a mathematical formula similar to the one used in Silver to define an
unbalanced legislative district be feasibly applied to define a racially imbalanced
school? It should be remembered that whenever an attempt is made to deal with
de facto school segregation a decision has to be made whether or not the
particular school under scrutiny is in fact racially imbalanced. That is, a conclusion must be made that the presence of a certain percentage of minority
88 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

89377 U.S. 695 (1964).
40 63 A.C. at 287, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 314, 405 P.2d at 138.
41377

U.S. at 577.

4 377 U.S. at 710.
13 63 A.C. at 284-85,

46 Cal. Rptr. at 313, 405 P.2d at 137, referring to 377 U.S.
533, 578-81 and 377 U.S. 695, 710.
44 63 A.C. at 287, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 314-15, 405 P.2d at 138-39.
45 H.R. 5505, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
46 63 A.C. at 287, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 314, 405 P.2d at 139.
47 111 CONG. Ec. 4960 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1965).
48

CoNG.

The bill was sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 18, 1965. 111
EEc.5226 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1965). A hearing was held on May 4, 1965, but

no action has been taken on the bill since that date.

NOTES
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group students does or does not constitute an nbalanced situation. The New
49
Jersey Commissioner of Education decided that schools containing 99 per cent,
98 per cent, 50 and 96 per cent 5 ' Negro students, respectively, were racially
segregated. The New York State Commissioner of Education issued a memorandum to all local school authorities on June 17, 1963, requiring immediate
action to bnng about racial balance in the schools of the State. He stated that
"a racially unbalanced school is defined as having fifty per cent or more Negro
pupils enrolled." 52 Although the commissioner directed that the definition be used
for purposes of a report to be submitted to him by all local school boards, the
figure of fifty per cent has been used as a guideline in New York since the
53
issuance of the memorandum.
Turning to our formula for definig racial imbalance, the ideal school should
reflect as closely as possible the racial complexion of the entire school district,
just as the ideal assembly district in the Silver case contained one-eightieth of the
State's entire population to correspond with the eighty seats in the assembly.
Next; to paraphrase Chief Justice Warren in Reynolds v. Sims, some deviation
from the ideal of schools having the same proportion of nonwhite students may be
justified to allow compactness and contiguity and to maintain the integrity of the
school district. Therefore we cannot be so strict as to require that every school
contain exactly the same percentage of a racial minority as the entire school
district. Some deviation must be permitted as in Silver, and it must be of enough
magnitude to enable the school board still to consider the customary criteria for
school zoning. 54 On the other hand, to paraphrase Chief Justice Traynor's statement in Silver,55 the policies underlying the requirements of compactness and
contiguity and the maintenance of the integrity of the school district cannot
justify the extensive departure from the racial makeup of the community which
exists in some of our schools. In light of all the factors considered, the following
definition is suggested:
A school is racially anbalanced if its proportion of nonwhite to white56 stud49 Fisher

v. Board of Educ., 8

BAcE

50 Spruill v. Board of Educ., 8 RAcE
51Booker

v. Board of Educ., 8

Et.

RAcE

ELt. L. REP. 730 (1963).
L. REt. 1234 (1963).
REL. L. EP. 1228 (1963).

52 N.Y. State Conim'r of Educ., Memorandum to all Chief Local School Admminstrators and Presidentsof Boards of Educ., 8 RACE REL.L. REP.738, 739 (1963).
53

54

See Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y. 2d 259, 206 N.E. 2d 174, 258 N.Y.S. 2d 77 (1965).
The traditional criteria are (1)

minimzang the distance from home to school,

(2) avoiding traflic hazards and topographical barriers, (3) convemence of public transportation where it is necessary, (4) maximum utility of school space to avoid underutilized schools, and (5) avoidance of multiple shifting of pupils to insure continuity of
instruction. Maslow, De Facto School Segregation,6 Vnrt. L. REv. 353, 361 (1961).
U 63 A.C. at 284-85, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 313,405 P.2d at 137.
56 The task of deciding which students are "white" and which are "nonwhite" would
not be an easy one. But the Supreme Court was faced with the necessity of construing
the words, "white persons" in the Immigration and Nationalization Act of 1790 (tEv.
STAT. § 2169 (1875)) before the race restrictions were repealed in 1952. In United
States v. Bhagat Singh Thind the Court said, "the words 'white persons' are words of
common speech and not of scientific origin. The word, 'Caucasian,' not only was not
employed in the law, but was probably unfamiliar to the original framers of the statute
in 1790.
The words of the statute are to be interpreted in accordance with the un-
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ents is more than fifteen per cent greater, or more than fifteen per cent less, than
the proportion of nonwhite to white students of the same age group in the school
57
district as a whole.
"School district" would necessarily have to be further defined, probably as the
political subdivision which administers the schools under state law, whether it is
the city, county, township, or otherwise. 58
Another important question, but one beyond the scope of tis note, is the
application of sanctions-once a school is determined to be racially nbalancedto enforce balancing. The most effective would no doubt be those utilized in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964: federal funds could be withheld, and citizens,
or the Attorney General on their behalf, could bring civil actions to compel
school boards to act to bring about racial balance.
How would the definition work? Assume a school district in which there are
2,000 students. Assume that 400 or 20 per cent of these are nonwhite. The ideal
school in this district should contain 20 per cent nonwhite students. If school A
has 1,000 white students and school B has 600 white and 400 nonwhite students,
school B's student body is 40 per cent nonwhite or 5 per cent in excess of the
allowable deviation, while school A's student body has no nonwhite students,
also 5 per cent in excess of the permitted deviation. 59
Now suppose the same school district has four schools. Each school has 500
derstanding of the common man from whose vocabulary they were taken.
It may
be true that the blond Scandanavian and the brown Hindu have a common ancestor in
the dim reaches of antiquity, but the average man knows perfectly well that there are
unmistakable and profound differences today
The question for determination
is not, therefore, whether by the speculative process of ethnological reasoning we may
present a probability to the scientific mind that they have the same origin, but whether
we can satisfy the common understanding that they are now the same, or sufficiently
the same, to justify the interpreters of a statute-written in words of common speech,
for common understanding, by unscientific men-in classifying them together in the
statutory category as white persons." 261 U.S. 204, 208-10.
57 Compare a sociologist's definition m Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F Supp.
819, 829 (N.D. Ind.), aft'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924
(1964).
It should be noted that if Congress were to enact legislation dealing with de facto
segregation it would, in all probability, pass an omnibus bill covering many facets of the
de facto problem. The scope of this note is restricted to suggesting a definition of "racial
unbalance."
58 The school district is commonly regarded as a geographical subdivision of the
state created specifically for educational purposes. Board of Educ. v. Elliot, 319 Mich.
436, 29 N.W.2d 902 (1947) (legal division of territory created for educational purposes
with powers of state agency); Baldwin v. Beard of Educ., 76 N.D. 51, 33 N.W.2d
473 (1948) (territory which is political or civil subdivision of state and which adminmisters
public schools). NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-101 (1958) (the territory under the junsdiction of single school board).
Any attempt to gerrymander school districts to create or perpetuate racial segregation is clearly prohibited by the fourteenth amendment, which forbids any officil
action which discrimnates by subterfuge. Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963);
Holland v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 258 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1958); Taylor v. Board
of Educ., 191 F Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), cert. dented, 368 U.S. 94 (1961).
59 There are two methods of applying the factor of 15% to our illustration. One is
to use 15% of the number of nonwhite students in the ideal school, which would be 30
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students. School A has 499 whites and one nonwhite. Schools B, C, and D have
367 white and 133 nonwhite students each. Schools B, C, and D have approximately 26.6 per cent nonwhite students or a deviation of only 6.6 per cent from
the ideal school. But school A is imbalanced because it has only .02 per cent
nonwhite students and it would have to have at least 5 per cent nonwhite students
to come within the maximum allowable deviation. If the definition of racial
imbalance did not include the provision of 15 per cent less as well as 15 per
cent more, school A in the above example could remain the type which the
New York Commissioner desired to correct when he issued his memorandum
of June 17, 1963: "When a neighborhood school becomes improperly exclusive
in fact or in spirit, when it is viewed as being reserved for certain community
it does not serve the purposes of democratic education." 60
groups
Finally let us consider a school district where the percentage of nonwhite
students is small-i per cent for example. As in the examples above, there are
2,000 students in the school district, and 4 schools, each containing 500 students.
But there are only 20 nonwhite students and all 20 are in the same school. It can
be persuasively argued that it would be absurd to require that the 20 nonwhites
be divided among the 4 schools. Under the suggested definition there would be
no need to distribute them in this manner because in no case does the deviation
approach 15 per cent from the ideal school. 6 '
The definition would work preemptively not only in those states which have
no definition of their own,62 but also in New York, since it is quite possible for
the proportion of nonwhites in a particular school to exceed the allowable 15 per
cent deviation, though the total number of nonwhites in the school is less than
50 per cent. Likewise it is possible for the proportion of nonwhites in a school
to be well within the 15 per cent deviation though the school has more than 50
per cent nonwhite students.
The Constitutional Question
The most serious problem in the analogy to reapportionment is that, while
the Supreme Court has held that unequal legislative districts are a demal of
equal protection,63 it has not held that the equal protection clause imposes a
duty on the school board to alleviate de facto segregation. This is the second of
(15% of 200). Using this method the number of nonwhites in a particular school
could fluctuate from 170 to 230. The other method is to use 15% of the total population
of the particular school. This figure would be 150 (15% of 1,000) and would allow
the number of nonwhite students in a particular school to fluctuate between 50 and
350. The second method was chosen because it allows the school board greater latitude
and does not require rezoning in districts where the percentage of nonwhite students
is very
60 small.

Statement Proposed by the New York State Education Commissioner's Advisory
Committee on Human Relations and Community Tensions, 8 RAcE REr. L. REP. 739,
740 (1963).
61 If the first method of applying the factor of 15% were used in this illustration
(see n.59 supra) each school could have a minimum of 4 nonwhite students and a
maximum of 6. Even if the factor were increased to 50%, each school would have to
have at least 2 but not more than 8 nonwhite students.
62 Presumably this would be every state except New York. Research has uncovered
no other state-made definitions.
63 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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the two basic difficulties of de facto segregation as reported by the United States
Civil Rights Commission. 64 A full discussion of the constitutional issues of de facto
segregation is not feasible here, but it has received adequate treatment elsewhere. 65 On one side is the proposition that the Constitution is "color blind"6 6
and that race cannot be taken into account even to fulfill a compelling moral
obligation. The Brown decision prohibits discrimination, but it does not compel
integration where there is no state action causing segregation.67 On the other
hand there are those who claim that the equal protection clause should be construed as imposmg a duty on the states to take amffrmative action to eliminate
school segregation regardless of its cause, simply because its effect is to deny
68
children of racial minorities equal educational opportunity.
The fact that the present status of de facto segregation, vis-h-vis the equal
protection clause, is doubtful should be no barrier to the definitive legislation
suggested, if Congress decides to legislate in this area. Such definitive legislation
would put the question of constitutionality squarely before the Supreme Court.6 9
Precisely in point here is a letter from President Roosevelt to the chairman of
a House subcommittee a few weeks before the enactment of the Bituminous
Coal Act of 1935.70 In it he urged favorable treatment of the bill by the committee and concluded:
Manifestly, no one is in a position to give assurance that the proposed act will
But the situation is so urgent and the benewithstand the constitutional tests
64 1963 CmviL Bicurs CO m'N REPr.

65

55 (see n.30 supra).

See generally Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation:Progressand Prospects,
64 CoLu . L. REv. 193 (1964); Bloch, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Forbid De
Facto Segregation?, 16 W REs. L. REv. 532 (1965); Carter, De Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and ConstitutionalQuestions Presented, 16 W Rts.
L. RE . 502 (1965); Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional
Concepts, 78 HAv. L. RE-v. 564 (1965); Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools,
58 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 157 (1964); Maslow, De Facto School Segregation, 6 V.m.. L.
REv. 353 (1961); Comment, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: Constitutional
Dimensions and Judicial Response, 18 VAND. L. B-v. 1290 (1965).
66 This concept originated with Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 559 (1896) and was the basis for the decision in Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S.
483 (1954).
67
Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 209
(7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964). Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F Supp.
820, 824 (D. Del. 1962).
68The decision in Barksdale v. Springfield School Committee, 237 F Supp. 543
(W.D. Mass.), vacated, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965), squarely adopts this construction, but the First Circuit did not accept it. In accord with the district court's decision
in Barksdale is Jackson v. Pasadena City' School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 31 Cal. Rptr.
P.2d 878 (1963) (dictum).
606, 382
69
In United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 448-49 (1953), Justice
Jackson said, "The principle is old and deeply unbedded in our jurisprudence that this
Court requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if the statutory language
The predominant consideration is that we should
leaves no reasonable alternative.
be sure Congress has intentionally put its power in issue by the legislation in question
before we undertake a pronouncement which may have far-reaching consequences upon
the power of Congress or the powers reserved to the several states."
70 49 Stat. 991 (1935).

